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1        Introduction 
 
In this paper, I discuss Jenefer Robinson’s personalist account of 
pictorial expression.1 According to personalism, a picture possesses 
the expressive properties we attribute to it because we take it that 
someone expresses E in the work. Robinson’s particular strategy 
exploits the concept of an implied persona who ‘unifies’ and 
‘specifies’ what is expressed.2 Dominic Lopes challenges this view by 
attacking what he takes to be a flawed assumption motivating the 
personalist account: the priority of figure expression.3  Once we 
acknowledge this flaw, he argues, there is no good reason to prefer 
personalism to an impersonalist theory. I will argue that Robinson 
qua personalist can pre-empt this strike by clarifying the relation 
between (a) what a picture expresses and (b) what is depicted as 
expressing in the picture. Rather than leading with the idea that 
personalism unifies or determines the meaning, I argue that 
impersonalism diminishes it and that, should it be accepted, we 
would be left with an impoverished view of what specific art pieces 
can mean.  
 
 
 
 
 
1 Also referred to as a ‘persona-theory’ or ‘persona-view’, see Robinson 2005, 2007 
and 2017. 
2 Robinson 2017, p. 260, p. 263. 
3 Lopes 2005, pp. 50-65. 
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2        Personalism 
 
‘‘NightHawks’ is melancholy’ (J1)  
‘Hopper is melancholy’ (J2) 
 
If Hopper feels sad, angry or nervous, Josephine might pick up on 
how he feels simply by looking at the expression on his face. When 
Hopper’s mental states are revealed in this way, his expression is said 
to be ‘transitive’.5 Some behaviours are intransitive, that is they have 
the outward appearance of a transitive expression (a smile) but there 
are no mental states expressed. An example would be a smiling 
zombie. Josephine sees the zombie with the look of a smile, thinks of 
something mentalese, but nothing is in fact conveyed.  
Whether we can map this distinction onto instances of 
pictorial expression is controversial. Intuitions run in both 
directions. Some think that we see the “mind, sensibility and skills”6 
of the painter in the work. Others think that the look of (J1) is 
parasitic on the public criteria or look of (J2), and so expression can 
be successfully tokened intransitively.7  
Personalists argue that pictorial expression is always 
transitive, although they do not claim that all pictures are expressive 
in this sense. To give an indication of the kind of pictures that are 
considered expressive, ‘The Scream’, ‘The Raft of the Medusa’ and 
‘Guernica’ are typically discussed as promising candidates. 
Meanwhile, scientific illustrations and maps seem to lack these 
expressive qualities. There are of course difficult cases, like children’s 
drawings or the work of mental patients, but I will just put these to 
one side for now. 
 
5 The term receives sustained discussion in Part 11 of Wittgenstein 1958. In the 
literature the terms ‘expressing’ and ‘being expressive of’ are used to express the 
same idea.  
6 Gayford 2010. 
7 Kivy 1980, pp. 67-68; Davies 1994; Lopes 2005. 
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Robinson, qua personalist, constructs her strong version of 
the view by conjoining two claims,  
 
(Pa) viewers view or should view the expressive content as 
transitive, and  
(Pb) the creation of expressive content should be understood 
as a transitive act of expression.8  
 
Even if a personalist did commit to (Pa) and (Pb), (Pa) does not imply 
(Pb), and vice versa. However, as we shall see, Robinson’s account 
endorses both claims. 
 
 3        Robinson  
 
According to Robinson, pictorial expression is transitive. A picture 
expresses only if the artist expresses, by articulating her mental states 
(M) through the work: (Pb). For the sufficient conditions of 
expression to be met, a competent viewer must be able to pick up the 
expression: (Pa).9 The artist articulates (M) through an implied 
persona, whose (i) expression is picked up by viewers and (ii) who is 
a psychological extension of the actual artist. This two-step process 
makes her view weaker than so-called transmission theories, 
according to which the actual artist’s emotions are said to be directly 
transmitted through the vehicle of the painting to a receiver.10 The 
implied persona, functioning as an expresser, unifies and determines 
what is expressed.11 In a discussion of Spiegelman’s ‘Maus’12, Robinson 
says: 
 
 
8 Theorists who claim (Pa) include Levinson 2006 and Vermazen 1986. Theorists 
who claim (Pb) include Robinson 2005 and Wollheim 1987. 
9 Robinson 2007, p. 36; Robinson 2005, p. 270; Robinson 2017. 
10 Collingwood 1938; Tolstoy 1962.  
11 Robinson 2017, p. 260, p. 263. 
12 Ibid., pp. 255-257. 
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Barring any reasons for scepticism about 
Spiegelman’s sympathies, it seems clear that the 
horror and dread expressed by the implied author 
of the picture reflect traits of compassion and 
distress that can safely be attributed to the artist 
himself.14 
In this way, it is suggested that a psychological link ties implied artist 
to actual artists. Because implied artists are a construct of the actual 
artist’s mind, they are constrained by the actual artist’s own 
psychological profile and so contain “traces” of them when extended 
into the pictorial world.15 She says ‘The Scream’ is, 
full of repressed desires, melancholy, and angst, 
and this is of course an important side of Munch’s 
own personality.16  
However, there is more to pictorial expression than merely depicting 
a figure in an expressive posture or with an expressive facial 
expression. Some figures may be transitively expressive, such as 
Munch’s howling figure in ‘The Scream’, but others may be 
intransitively expressive. Those depictions which merely look sad or 
happy, such as models in a Calvin Klein advert, or emoticons, are not 
really cases of pictorial expression. They are examples of technê: 
skilled depictions of emotion.17 Instances of technê map to Zombie 
‘expressions’ as they convey nothing, whereas transitive expressions 
map to (J2) since they convey the artist’s (M). The difference between 
the two apparently rests on how the artist has used what he paints to 
“articulate or individuate an emotion” often without knowing “what 
he will express until he has expressed it”.18 For this reason, some 
 
14 Ibid., p. 257. 
15 Robinson 1985, p .227. 
16 Robinson 2017, p. 11. 
17 Robinson 2005, pp. 2005-228. 
18 Ibid., p. 267. 
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depictions are and some are not also pictorial expressions. 
Pictograms and sentimental technê elements are “typically 
subordinate to and explained by the overall expression of emotions 
or emotional attitudes by the artist or his persona in the picture”, 
where the implied persona acts as a proxy for the mental states of the 
actual artist.19 
 
4         Lopes’ challenge 
 
Lopes develops one of the few sustained philosophical accounts of 
intransitive pictorial expression, in which he denies both (Pa) and 
(Pb). His argument against (Pa) is most germane to the analysis I 
develop here.20  
Lopes identifies three ways a picture expresses emotions.21 In 
figure expression (hereafter FE), such as occurs in Daumier’s 
‘Fatherly Discipline’, the depiction of a toddler in a tantrum 
straightforwardly represents a toddler having a conniption.22 In-scene 
expression (hereafter SE) elements of nature may be depicted 
expressively to correspond or clash with FE.  
The shipwrecked, starving figures aboard 
Delacroix’s Raft of the Medusa express despair; 
the roiling sea in which they are set adrift 
expresses dumb, haughty malignance; and the 
tiny ship on the horizon that might signify safe 
harbour instead expresses blind indifference.23 
Lopes insists he is not claiming that by FE and SE “expression is 
depiction”.24 His view is that “by depicting a figure or scene as 
 
19 Robinson 2017, p. 263. 
20 Lopes 2005. 
21 Ibid., p. 57. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., p. 53. 
24 Ibid., p.56. 
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expressing the emotion” pictures express mimetically.25 Mimetic 
expression may be bolstered or undermined by a third mode: design 
expression (hereafter DE). In DE, some brute fact about the way we 
correlate colours, shapes and textures with emotions links the 
“picture’s design or surface” with expressive qualities. For example, 
Mondrian’s complaint that curves are “too emotional” reveals “the 
trouble is with the curves themselves, not with anything that they 
depict”.26  
Lopes argues that Robinson (qua personalist) has taken FE to 
be the paradigm case of pictorial expression and as a result, 
developed an erroneous genealogy of personalism in order to retrofit 
SE and DE to FE. He argues that, for personalists 
[s]cene expression raises a missing person 
problem. Unless there can be expression in the 
absence of a being, to whom the expressed 
emotion is attributable, then either there is no 
scene expression or the being in question is one 
not depicted.27  
But, he continues, there is no good independent reason to “attribute 
the emotion that is putatively expressed by a scene to some person 
who is not depicted” and so the “expression of emotion does not 
require that there be anyone to whom the emotion expressed is 
attributable”.28  
Robinson’s crucial error according to Lopes, is to assume that 
viewers sustain an FE figure expression line of thought in the absence 
of figures.29 But “once this assumption is dropped” he notes we “may 
adopt an impersonal theory […] a dog can smile when it is not happy 
 
25 Ibid., p. 56. 
26 Ibid., p. 57. 
27 Ibid., p. 58 (my italics for emphasis). 
28 Ibid., p. 59. 
29 Ibid., p. 70. 
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(and so can zombies)”.30 
 
5        An Error 
 
Lopes’ aim is to discredit the motivation for personalism. But there is 
an error in his analysis. By confronting it, Robinson would neutralise 
an objection to arguments in support of (Pa) and (Pb).   
Lopes’ error is to conflate his categories of expression with a 
picture’s expression of an emotion E. He says FE is, for personalists, 
the central manifestation of a transitive expression. But if the 
personalist is not motivated by the missing person problem, as 
described by Lopes, then his objection is neutralised. And, indeed, 
the personalist claim is not motivated by the missing person 
problem. Personalists do not argue that simply seeing depicted 
figures expressing emotions FE is sufficient for seeing a picture as 
being an act of expression. The flickr algorithm might compile rows 
of illustrated smiling faces, each showing those faces expressing 
happiness, yet I do not see the flickr webpage as an act of expression.  
Instead of rejecting Lopes’ analysis, Robinson tacitly accepts 
the notion of the categories and develops her argument in response 
to them. In doing so, she accedes to his construal of the ‘missing 
person’. She argues that the missing person is ‘a persona’ of the artist 
and also an ‘internal spectator’ in the picture-world.31 By pointing out 
that ‘form and content’ are interdependent, Robinson argues that 
Lopes is wrong to claim there are brute facts about the expressive 
qualities of DE and that it comes apart from FE and SE.32 She says, 
Kokoshka’s Self Portrait […] shows the painter 
looking anxious and insecure (as in ‘figure 
expression’), but also conveys anxiety and 
insecurity in the agitated passages of paint, the 
 
30 Ibid. 
31 Robinson 2017, p. 261. 
32 Ibid., p. 262. 
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awkward perspective and the vague, unstable use 
of space (design expression).33  
There is an unresolved tension in Robinson’s reply to Lopes. The 
above quotation suggests that she thinks that DE is solely responsible 
for giving us the implied persona expression (FE is responsible for 
the figure ‘looking anxious’, DE for how the picture ‘conveys 
anxiety’). “Design expression” must refer to DE, since she denies that 
there “is a fourth species of pictorial expression, in addition to figure, 
scene and design expression”.34  However, this contradicts a different 
response she makes to Lopes, namely, that: “Figure, scene and design 
‘expression’ in and of themselves are only ‘expressive elements,’ not 
genuine artistic expressions of emotion”.35  It may be that the 
categories are significant in the way we come to see the picture as 
expressive, but on the basis of her Kokoshka example alone, it is 
difficult to see how they relate to each other.  
My main concern, however, is that Robinson leads with the 
idea that Kokoshka’s expression specifies and unifies what we see in 
the picture. I think that there is an alternative way to phrase the 
motivation for the personalist case, now that Lopes’ challenge to the 
personalist starting point has been neutralised. This alternative links 
to Robinson’s observations concerning the formal qualities of the 
picture as well as the things we see depicted in it, and brings out the 
different levels at which we understand a picture. For example, at 
first glance ‘NightHawks’ is a straightforward scene executed in a 
“light touch” noir-ish style. But given due attention, we can see a 
more serious or ‘deeper’ meaning in the picture. ‘NightHawks’ 
exhibits some stylistic features that seem incompatible with each 
other: for instance, the faces are rendered in a quite crude and mask-
like way, while the ambience of the picture overall is sophisticated 
and self-assured. This can encourage the view that a naïve painterly 
 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., p. 265. 
35 Ibid. 
The Implied Painter 
 
23 
 
style is being put to use by a mature, skilled artist. Walton suggests 
that this kind of multi-level impression of an implied painter 
operates at a “deeper level” than just taking it that the work is 
painted by a naïve illustrator and can lead theoretically to the viewer 
experiencing a ‘naïve illustrator’ in some paintings that “derives from 
an obscure partial awareness of a multi-level situation of this kind”.36    
Since Lopes’ categories of expression can only account for 
meaning derived from the formal (visible) qualities of the picture 
surface, meaning is restricted to what goes on inside the represented 
pictorial world. Robinson can push the worry that this is insufficient 
to capture the full extent of expressive meaning. The appeal of (Pa), 
in contrast, is to be found in how it explains these additional levels of 
meaning, unavailable to interpreters working solely with Lopes’ 
categories. If so, then there are good reasons to consider the 
argument for implied expression.  
An obvious counter from the impersonalist could involve 
denying that implied personae have any place in the interpretation 
of paintings. However, Robinson would appear to be on firm ground 
as (1) we need to account for more than the meaning of the visible 
formal properties of the picture, and (2) implied (narrator) personae 
are well established in the (relatively mature) philosophy of 
literature, where they are broadly understood as conveying 
intentions, beliefs or norms that do not belong to any of the 
characters in the novel. 37  Without a principled reason against 
extending (2) to pictures, Robinson is free to push for (Pa).  
There is, however, the following objection to (2). Although 
some pictures, like some novels, give us the impression of the kind of 
person who created them, we should be cautious about how we 
extend the concept from narrative literary works to pictorial 
expression.  
 
36 Walton 1976, p. 52. 
37 Booth 1983.  
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Walton notes that for those novels that have implied 
narrators, the narrator plays a crucial role because,  
He mediates the reader’s access to the rest of the 
fictional world; we know what happens in the 
fictional world only from his reports about it.38  
But since the way viewers represent the pictorial world can be much 
more direct, the mediating gaze of the implied painter does not seem 
as crucial. I judge that a (fictional) tragedy has occurred by being told 
by an (implied) narrator, “baby shoes for sale; never worn”. In 
contrast, I can judge (in the pictorial world) that there is a listless 
dynamic between the people in the bar from by how they appear 
directly to me. Although this deserves much more explanation and 
unpacking, it seems, from this initial observation, that the expression 
of an implied painter is going to play an incidental, rather than 
crucial, role in how the viewer gleans the expressive meaning of the 
picture. These considerations provide further support for my view 
that implied expression, wherever it may be found, is an additional 
level of expressive meaning that enriches viewer understanding, 
rather than a type of meaning that specifies and coheres what is 
expressed in the picture.   
For reasons of space, I have simply noted this qualification on 
the arguments for (Pa). I now put the issue to one side since even if 
one can make out the case for this multi-level experience of (Pa), 
there is a more pressing issue that needs addressing, concerning the 
move from (Pa) to (Pb).  
 
6        Moving from (Pa) to (Pb) 
 
Having dealt with Lopes’ objection to the motivation for personalism, 
I would like to now turn to the way Robinson’s argument moves from 
 
38 Walton 1976, p. 50. 
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(Pa) to (Pb). I note some difficulties with the move and also some 
reasons to be cautious about the way (2) extends to pictures.   
Robinson proceeds in more or less the following way. In real 
life, we form reliable impressions of people by looking at how they 
dress, the way they talk and so on.39 An extrovert may wear bright 
colours; a confident character may strut; a wit produces pithy 
humorous observations and it is these traits that necessarily and 
inevitably reveal character. Similarly, in reading a novel or looking at 
a picture we may form an impression of the kind of person who 
authored or painted it. Sensitive prose and elegant brushstrokes will 
reveal aspects of the artist’s personality which readers and viewers 
will pick up through some kind of epistemic seeing.  
Even putting to one side the worries about whether we can 
reliably infer facts about, say, Josephine’s psychology from her 
preference for ditzy chintz skirts, and simply granting Robinson the 
inference in real life, it is still not at all clear how this transposes to 
the case of pictures. This is in part due to her two-step notion of 
transitive pictorial expression: the claim that viewers can infer facts 
about the artist’s psychology on the basis of a construct, the implied 
persona. For example, if it is the case that Hopper expresses his 
melancholy in ‘NightHawks’ then when the viewer views the 
melancholy as issuing from his implied persona (a construct) in the 
work in virtue of the implied persona that Hopper has constructed 
(hereafter Hopper’), the viewer views Hopper’s melancholy.  
Robinson has told us that because Hopper’ is the creation of 
Hopper, Hopper’ is necessarily shaped by and linked to the 
personality of Hopper. So if one picks up on an expression of 
melancholy by Hopper’ we also pick up on Hopper’s melancholy. 
Robinson relies on this psychological link to move from (Pa) to (Pb).  
This is tendentious as it implies painters cannot create 
implied personas that are psychologically distinct from themselves. A 
well-known counterexample to this, however, is Tolstoy’s ability to 
 
39 Robinson 1985. 
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write with compassion while lacking compassion in his personal 
relationships. For this reason, it expects too much of impressions 
since it cannot be that viewers go from (Pa) (viewing the painting as 
an expression by Hopper’) to (Pb) (understanding the painting to be 
an expression by Hopper), since Hopper’ is merely a construct and so 
has no psychological reality. I cannot, when engaging with the 
ventriloquist’s doll, legitimately move from the impression of 
sentience to believing I am picking up psychological states of the doll 
that are somehow given reality by an extension of the ventriloquist’s 
states. So, it is not clear how viewers pick up on the emotions or traits 
of Hopper by constructing Hopper’. Even if viewers form the 
impression of an implied persona, since there is no entailment from 
(Pa) to (Pb), the fact that a viewer has the impression of an implied 
painter who expresses melancholy is not an argument for (Pb). The 
concern is that the distinction between the two claims that a 
personalist can make, (Pa) and (Pb), is being glossed over. 
Robinson could argue that viewers infer a sincere connection 
between artists and their implied personae, by relying on extra-
pictorial biographical information. The problem with this attempted 
solution, however, is that even if the viewer identified Hopper’ as 
Hopper, it would still be the case that the viewer was connecting 
with Hopper’ and not Hopper. Put in the counterfactual mood, the 
viewer would understand the picture even if they did not make the 
identification. So, the link between Hopper’ and Hopper is not 
conceptual and, as we have noted, we do not have grounds to allow 
that it is psychological. 
For these reasons, one cannot accept that the expression of 
an implied persona is also the actual expression of the artist. This 
should, however, not discourage further reflection on the 
significance of our impressions of a painting’s origin. Arcing drips, 
bold palette knife work, and delicate glazes of paint may suggest a 
sensuous, agitated or careful personality in the style of the work. We 
can recognise this and seek an explanation for why the viewer 
chooses to represent the implied persona as if it were a psychological 
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continuation of the actual artist. That is, we may question why 
viewers make this connection, without supposing that the 
connection reflects a constitutive tie between two distinct identities. 
A viewer who sees the painting as an expression by Hopper would be 
making a harmless transition from viewing the expressive content as 
transitive to seeing the creation of the expressive content as a 
transitive act of expression. On this story, Robinson’s move from (Pa) 
to (Pb) could be understood as a benign further claim, entertained 
but not entailed by the central issue. Meanwhile, implied expression 
can still be understood as a significant source of expressive meaning 
for paintings and, moreover, one that the impersonalist struggles to 
explain.   
 
7        Conclusion  
 
I have argued that impersonalism impoverishes our comprehension 
of some expressive paintings because it fails to fully reveal all the 
meaning in the work that only implied expression will explain. While 
this falls short of providing an argument for Robinson’s controversial 
claims about the actual painter, it provides a reason to accept (Pa). 
However, there remains a highly complex and unresolved issue: 
namely, whether, in picking up on implied expression, we pick up on 
the mental states of painters or their implied personas, or if we 
merely imagine that we do so.  
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